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Abstract
Weibo and other popular Chinese microblogging sites are
well known for exercising internal censorship, to comply
with Chinese government requirements. This research
seeks to quantify the mechanisms of this censorship:
how fast and how comprehensively posts are deleted.
Our analysis considered 2.38 million posts gathered over
roughly two months in 2012, with our attention focused
on repeatedly visiting “sensitive” users. This gives us a
view of censorship events within minutes of their occur-
rence, albeit at a cost of our data no longer representing a
random sample of the general Weibo population. We also
have a larger 470 million post sampling from Weibo’s
public timeline, taken over a longer time period, that is
more representative of a random sample.
We found that deletions happen most heavily in the
first hour after a post has been submitted. Focusing
on original posts, not reposts/retweets, we observed that
nearly 30% of the total deletion events occur within 5–
30 minutes. Nearly 90% of the deletions happen within
the first 24 hours. Leveraging our data, we also consid-
ered a variety of hypotheses about the mechanisms used
by Weibo for censorship, such as the extent to which
Weibo’s censors use retrospective keyword-based cen-
sorship, and how repost/retweet popularity interacts with
censorship. We also used natural language processing
techniques to analyze which topics were more likely to
be censored.
1 Introduction
Virtually all measurements of Internet censorship are bi-
ased in some way, simply because it is not feasible to
test every keyword or check every post at small incre-
ments of time. In this paper, we describe our method for
tracking censorship on Weibo, a popular microblogging
platform in China, and the results of our measurements.
Our system focuses on a core set of users who are in-
terconnected through their social graph and tend to post
about sensitive topics. This biases us towards the content
posted by these particular users, but enables us to mea-
sure with high fidelity the speed of the censorship and
discern interesting patterns in censor behaviors.
Sina Weibo (weibo.com, referred to in this paper sim-
ply as “Weibo”) has the most active user community of
any microblog site in China [39]. Weibo provides ser-
vices which are similar to Twitter, with @usernames,
#hashtags, reposting, and URL shortening. In February
2012, Weibo had over 300 million users, and about 100
million messages sent daily [3]. Like Twitter in other
countries, Weibo plays an important role in the discourse
surrounding current events in China. Both professional
reporters and amateurs can provide immediate, first-hand
accounts and opinions of events as they unfold. Also like
Twitter, Weibo limits posts to 140 characters, but 140
characters in Chinese can convey significantly more in-
formation than in English. Weibo also allows embedded
photos and videos, as well as comment threads attached
to posts.
China employs both backbone-level filtering of IP
packets [5, 6, 11, 23, 37, 43] and higher level filtering
implemented in the software of, for example, blog plat-
forms [15, 20, 28], chat programs [13, 29] and search en-
gines [30, 41]. Work specific to Weibo [2, 9] is discussed
in more detail in Section 2. To our knowledge ours is the
first work to focus on how quickly microblog posts are
removed—on a scale of minutes after they are posted.
This fidelity in measurement allows us to not only accu-
rately measure the speed of the censorship, but also to
compare censorship speeds with respect to topics, censor
methods, censor work schedules, and other illuminating
patterns.
What our results illustrate is that Weibo employs
“defense-in-depth” in their strategy for filtering content.
Internet censorship represents a conflict between the cen-
sors, who seek to filter content according to some policy,
and the users who are subject to that censorship. Censor-
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ship can serve to squelch conversations directly as well as
to chill future discussion with the threat of state surveil-
lance. Our goal in this paper is to catalog the wide variety
of mechanisms that Weibo’s censors employ.
This research has several major contributions:
• We describe the implementation of a method that
can detect a censorship event within 1–2 minutes of
its occurrence. A large amount of Weibo posts are
collected constantly via two APIs [26]. There are
more than 470 million posts from the public time-
line and 2.38 million posts from the user timeline in
our database.
• To further understand how the Weibo system can
react so quickly in terms of deleting posts with sen-
sitive content, we propose four hypotheses and at-
tempt to support each with our data. We also de-
scribe several experiments that shed light on cen-
sorship practices on Weibo. The overall picture we
illuminate in this paper is that Weibo employs a
distributed, defense-in-depth strategy for removing
sensitive content.
• Using natural language processing techniques that
overcome the usage of neologisms, named entities,
and informal language which typifies Chinese social
media, we perform a topical analysis of the deleted
posts and compare the deletion speeds for different
topics. We find that the topics where mass removal
happens the fastest are those that are hot topics in
Weibo as a whole (e.g., the Beijing rainstorms or a
sex scandal). We also find that our sensitive user
group has overarching themes throughout all topics
that suggest discussion of state power (e.g., Beijing,
government, China, and the police).
The rest of this paper is structured as follows. Sec-
tion 2 gives some basic background information about
microblogging and Internet censorship in China. Then
Section 3 describes the methods we used for our mea-
surement and analysis, followed by Section 4 that de-
scribes the timing of censorship events. Section 5 intro-
duces the natural language processing we applied to the
data and presents results from topical analysis. Finally,
we conclude with a discussion of various Weibo filtering
mechanisms in Section 6.
2 Background
Starting from 2010, when microblogs debuted in China,
not only have there been many top news stories where
the reporting was driven by social media, but social me-
dia has also been part of the story itself for a number
of prominent events [21, 38], including the protests of
Wukan [33], the Deng Yujiao incident [32], the Yao
Jiaxin murder case [35], and the Shifang protest [36].
There have also been events where social media has
forced the government to address issues directly, such as
the Beijing rainstorms in July 2012.
Chinese social media analysis is challenging [27].
One of many concerns that can hinder this work is the
general difficulty of mechanically processing Chinese
text. Western speakers (and algorithms) expect words
to be separated by whitespace or punctuation. In writ-
ten Chinese, however, there are no such word bound-
ary delimiters. The word segmentation problem in Chi-
nese is exacerbated by the existence of unknown words
such as named entities (e.g., people, companies, movies)
or neologisms (substituting characters that appear sim-
ilar to others, or otherwise coining new euphemisms
or slang expressions, to defeat keyword-based censor-
ship) [12]. Furthermore, since social media is heavily
centered around current events, it may well contain new
named entities that will not appear in any static lexi-
con [8].
Despite these concerns, Weibo censorship has been
the subject of previous research. Bamman et al. [2]
performed a statistical analysis of deleted posts, show-
ing that the presence of some sensitive terms indicated a
higher probability of the deletion of a post. Their work
also showed some geographic patterns in post deletion,
with posts from the provinces of Tibet and Qinghai ex-
hibiting a higher deletion rate than other provinces. Wei-
boScope [9] also collects deleted posts from Weibo, but
their strategy is to follow all users with a high number of
followers. This is in contrast to our strategy which is to
follow a core set of users who have a high rate of post
deletions, some of which have many followers and some
of which have few. The deletion events in these works
are measured with a resolution of hours or days. Our
system is able to detect deletion events at the resolution
of minutes.
3 Methodology
To have a better understanding of what the Weibo system
is targeting for censorship deletions, and how fast they do
so, we have developed a system which collects removed
posts on targeted users in almost real time.
3.1 Identifying the sensitive user group
In Weibo each IP address and Application Programming
Interface (API) has a rate limit for access to the service.
This forced us to make a number of engineering com-
promises, notably focusing our attention where we felt
we could find those posts most likely to be subject to
censorship. We decided to focus on users who we have
seen being censored in the past, under the assumption
that they will be more likely to be censored in the future.
We call this group of users the sensitive group.
We started with 25 sensitive users that we discov-
ered manually, leveraging a list from China Digital
Times [4] of sensitive keywords which are not allowed
to be searched on Weibo’s server. To find our initial
sample, we searched using out-dated keywords that were
later un-banned. For example,党产共 (Reverse of共产
党, which means “Communist Party”) was found to be
banned on 4 April 2011, but found to not be banned on
20 October 2011, which means the we were able to ob-
tain some posts containing党产共when we searched for
this keyword after 20 October 2011. From the search re-
sults, we picked 25 users who stood out for posting about
sensitive topics.
Next, we needed to broaden our search to a larger
group of users. We assumed that anybody who has been
reposted more than five times by our sensitive users must
be sensitive as well. We followed them for a period of
time and manually measured how often their posts were
deleted. Any user with more than 5 deleted posts was
added to our pool of sensitive users.
After 15 days of this process, our sensitive group in-
cluded 3,567 users, and within this group we observed
more than 4,500 post deletions daily, including about
1,500 “permission denied” deletions. (See Section 3.3
for discussion on different types of deletion events.)
Roughly 12% of the total posts from our sensitive users
were eventually deleted. Further, we have enough of
these posts to be able to run topical analysis algorithms,
letting us extract the main subjects that Weibo’s censors
seemed concerned with on any given day.
We contrast these statistics with WeiboScope [9], de-
veloped at the University of Hong Kong in order to track
trends on Weibo concurrently with our own study. The
core difference between our work and WeiboScope is
that they track a large sample: around 300 thousand users
who each have more than 1000 followers. Despite this,
they report observing no more than 100 “permission de-
nied” deletions per day. WeiboScope’s results, therefore,
are perhaps more representative of the overall impact of
Weibo’s censorship as a fraction of total Weibo traffic,
while our work has more resolving power to consider the
speed and techniques employed by Weibo’s censors.
Because we do not have access to WeiboScope’s data,
we are limited in our ability to make direct comparisons
of our datasets. They did briefly support data down-
loads, and we extracted their “2,500 last permission de-
nied data” on 20 July 2012. This service has since been
closed. Our system went live following user timelines
on the same date, giving us a single day from which we
might compare our data. For 20 July 2012, WeiboScope
observed 54 permission-denied posts, while our system
observed 1,056.
(Our own system does not yet support public, real-
time downloads of our data, which among other issues
could make it easier for Weibo to shut it down. An appro-
priate means of disseminating real-time results or regular
summaries is future work for our group.)
While our methodology cannot be considered to yield
a representative sample of Weibo users overall, we be-
lieve it is representative of how users who discuss sensi-
tive topics will experience Weibo’s censorship. We also
believe our methodology enables us to measure the top-
ics that Weibo is censoring on any given day.
3.2 Crawling
Once we settled on our list of users to follow, we wanted
to follow them with sufficient fidelity to see posts as they
were made and measure how long they last prior to being
deleted. Our target sampling resolution was one minute.
We use two APIs provided by Weibo, allowing us to
query individual user timelines as well as the public time-
line1. Starting in July 2012, we queried each of our 3,500
users, once per minute, for which Weibo returns the most
recent 50 posts. Deleted posts outside of this 50-post
window are not detected by our system, meaning that we
may be underestimating the number of older posts that
get deleted.
We also queried the public timeline roughly once ev-
ery four seconds, for which Weibo returns 200 recent
posts. Half of these posts appear to be 1–5 minutes older
than real-time, and the other half are hours older.
Weibo does not support anonymous queries to its
servers, requiring us to create fake accounts on the ser-
vice. Weibo further enforces rate limits both on these
users’ queries as well as on source IP addresses, regard-
less of what user account is being used for the query. To
overcome these concerns, we used roughly 300 concur-
rent Tor circuits [24], driven from our research comput-
ing cluster. Our resulting data was stored and processed
on a four-node cluster using Hadoop and HBase [1].
If and when Weibo might make a concerted effort to
block us, it is easy to imagine a ongoing game where
they invent new detection strategies and we invent new
workarounds. So far, this has not been an issue.
3.3 Detecting deletions
An absent post may have been censored, or it may have
been deleted for any of a variety of other reasons. User
1The user timeline returns both original posts and retweeted posts
by that user, while the public timeline only returns original posts. Also,
the public timeline appears to be only a sampling of the total public
traffic.
accounts can also be closed, possibly for censorship pur-
poses. Users cannot delete their own account, only the
system can delete accounts. We conducted a variety of
short empirical tests to see if we could distinguish the
different cases. We concluded that we can detect two
kinds of deletions.
If a user deletes his or her own post, a query for that
post’s unique identifier will return a “post does not ex-
ist” error. We have observed this same error code re-
turned from censorship events and we refer to these, in
the remainder of the paper as general deletion. However,
there is another error code, “permission denied,” which
seems to indicate that the relevant database record still
exists but has been flagged by some censorship event.
We refer to these as permission-denied deletions or sys-
tem deletions. In either case, the post is no longer visible
to Weibo users.
The ratio of system deletions to general deletions in
our user timeline data set is roughly 1:2. In this paper, we
generally focus on posts that have been system deleted,
because there appears to be no way for a user to induce
this state. It can only be the result of a censorship event
(i.e., there are no censorship false positives in our system
deletion dataset). Because we followed a core set of users
who post on sensitive subjects, we did not find it neces-
sary to account for spam in our user timeline dataset.
Our crawler, which repeatedly fetches each sensitive
user’s personal timeline, is searching for posts that ap-
pear and then are subsequently deleted. If a post is in
our database but is not returned from Weibo, then we
issue a secondary query for that post’s unique ID to de-
termine what error message is returned. Ultimately, with
the speed of our crawler, we can detect a censorship event
within 1–2 minutes of its occurrence.
For each returned post from Weibo, there is a field
which records the creation time of the post. The life-
time of a post is the time difference between the time our
system detected the post being deleted and the creation
time. Therefore a post’s lifetime recorded by our system
is never shorter than its real lifetime, and never longer
than its real lifetime by more than two minutes.
4 Timing of censorship
For easier explanation we first give some definitions. A
post can be a repost of another post, and can have embed-
ded images. Also other users can repost reposts. If post
A is a repost of post B, we call post A a child post and
post B a parent post. If post A is not a repost of another
post, we call post A a regular post.
Using our user tracking method, from 20 July 2012 to
8 September 2012, we have collected 2.38 million user
timeline posts, with a 12.8% total deletion rate (4.5% for
system deletions and 8.3% for general deletions). Note
that this deletion rate is specific to our users and not rep-
resentative of Weibo as a whole. With a brief analysis,
we found that 82% of the total deletions are child posts,
and 75% of the total deletions have pictures either in
themselves or in their parent post.
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Figure 1: Lifetime histograms. (a) and (b) are the life-
time histograms of all system deletions. (c) and (d) are
the lifetime histograms of regular text-only posts. (a)
and (c) show the histogram of the whole lifetime, (b)
and (d) only show the first two hours of the lifetime
histogram.
To demonstrate how long a post survives before it gets
deleted, we analyze the system deletion data set (see Sec-
tion 3.3). Figure 1 gives us a big picture of how fast the
Weibo system works for censorship purposes. The x axes
are the length of the lifetime divided into 5-minute bins,
and the y axes are the count of the deleted posts hav-
ing the lifetime in the corresponding bin. We note that
these figures have the distinctive shape of a power law or
long tailed distribution, implying that there is no partic-
ular time bound on Weibo’s censorship activity, despite
the bulk of it happening quickly, and that metrics like
mean and median are not as meaningful as they are in a
normal distribution.
We can see that the post bins with small lifetimes are
large. We zoom into the first 2 hours of data, which is
plotted in Figure 1 (c) and (d). This tells us that system
deletions start within 5 minutes, the same as text-only
regular posts. For both of them, the modal deletion age
appears to be between 5–10 minutes.
In our data set, 5% of the deletions happened in the
first 8 minutes, and within 30 minutes, almost 30% of
the deletions were finished. More than 90% of deletions
happened within one day after a post was submitted. This
demonstrates why a measurement fidelity on the order of
minutes, rather than days, is critical.
Considering the big data set that Weibo has to process,
the speed, especially the 5 to 10 minutes peak, is fast,
especially considering that the data cannot be processed
in a fully automated way. How can the Weibo system
find sensitive posts and remove them so quickly? On
the other hand, the long tails suggest that sensitive posts
can still be deleted even after an extended period. How
are those sensitive posts located by the moderators after
a month in their huge database? What factors affect a
post’s lifetime?
In this section, to find the answers to these questions,
we propose four hypotheses and then test them against
our data. Hypotheses 1 and 2 try to explain how the speed
of censorship on Weibo can be so fast. Hypothesis 3 ex-
plains why we see the long tails of the post lifetime for
censored posts in Figure 1. Hypothesis 4 tells us that the
deletion speed does not appear to be strongly related to
particular conversation topics, but rather to popular top-
ics (i.e., those that are being discussed on Weibo as a
whole according to our public timeline) where our core
sensitive users are putting a spin on the discussion that
involves themes of government power (see Section 5).
4.1 Post lifetime regression
Before we give our hypotheses, we first consider what
factors affect a post’s lifetime, regardless of the content
of the post.
For each post, besides the basic information about the
post itself, we also see an embedded picture, if present,
as well as a parent post identifier, if it is a repost. Also,
we know the number of followers and friends of each
user, as well as of any parent post’s user.
From the graphs in Figure 1, we decided to experi-
mentally fit a negative binomial regression to it to see
which factors affect the lifetime of a post. Table 1 and
Table 2 show the results for the regular posts and child
posts, respectively. Three asterisks (‘***’) indicates sta-
tistical significance, one asterisk (‘*’) indicates a coeffi-
cient that is not statistically significant, and no coefficient
is indicated with a dash (‘-’). We can regress the log life-
time for a regular post or a child post via:
ln(¤�Regularlifetime) = Intercept+b1(PHasPic)
+b2(Friends #)+b3(Posts #)
ln(⁄�Childlifetime) = Intercept+b1(PHasPic)
+b2(P.Friends #)+b3(P.Posts #)
We examine the effect on post lifetime of: the exis-
tence of a picture, the number of friends and followers,
and the number of posts sent by this user. We found that,
for both regular and child posts, the existence of a pic-
ture affects the post’s lifetime the most. That is, posts
with pictures have shorter lifetimes than posts without
pictures. Some of the user attributes, such as number of
friends or number of posts, also affect post lifetime. We
note that the coefficients for these are relatively small,
but for users with large numbers of friends or who write
large numbers of posts, these factors can have a sig-
nificant impact on the speed of that users’ posts being
censored. However other attributes of a user, such as
whether a Weibo user is “verified” by Weibo (i.e., Weibo
knows who they are as part of newer Chinese require-
ments that crack down on pseudonyms unconnected to
real world identities) or the number of followers of a user,
are not statistically significant factors in a post’s lifetime.
Table 1: Factors affecting post lifetime (regular posts).
Factors Coef Stat. Sig.
(Intercept) 7.41 ***
Has picture −4.07×10−1 ***
Number of friends −2.42×10−4 ***
Number of posts −5.23×10−5 ***
User verified – -
Number of followers – -
Table 2: Factors affecting post lifetime (child posts)
Factors Coef Stat. Sig.
(Intercept) 6.27 ***
Parent has picture −1.01×10−1 ***
Parent friends number −4.76×10−5 ***
Parent posts number 6.84×10−6 ***
Parent user verified 2.01×10−1 *
Parent followers number – -
4.2 Hypotheses
As a distributed system with 70,000 posts per minute,
Weibo has above a 10% rate of deletion in the pub-
lic timeline (first observed by Bamman et al. [2]; we
have seen similar behavior). This high deletion rate can
be the result of many processes, including anti-spam
features, user deletions, as well as anti-censorship fea-
tures. Within the deletions that we believe are censor-
ship events, we note that 40% of the deletions in our user
timeline data set occur within the first hour after a post
has appeared. Clearly, Weibo exerts significant controls
over its content.
Before censors deal with the sensitive posts which are
already in the system, are there filters which do not allow
certain posts to enter the Weibo system? This question
leads to our first hypothesis.
Hypothesis 1 Weibo has filtering mechanisms as a
proactive, automated defense.
To find out if there are filtering mechanisms, we at-
tempted to post posts containing sensitive words from
the China Digital Times [4] and Tao et al. [41]. Here we
summarize the filtering mechanisms Weibo was found to
apply based on our observations.
• Explicit filtering: Weibo will inform a poster that
their post cannot be released because of sensitive
content.
For example, on 1 August 2012, we tried to post “政
法委书记” (Secretary of the Political and Legisla-
tive Committee). When we submitted a post with
this character string in it, a warning message says
“Sorry, since this content violates ‘Sina Weibo reg-
ulation rules’ or a related regulation or policy, this
operation cannot be processed. If you need help,
please contact customer service.”
• Implicit filtering: Weibo sometimes suspends
posts until they can be manually checked, telling
the user that the delay is due to “server data syn-
chronization.”
For example when we submitted the post
‘youshenmefalundebanfa’ on the same day, 1
August 2012, Weibo responded with the mes-
sage “Your post has been submitted successfully.
Currently, there is a delay caused by server data
synchronization. Please wait for 1 to 2 minutes.
Thank you very much.” This delay, which fre-
quently takes much longer than the 1–2 minutes
suggested by Weibo, was triggered by our use of
the substring “falun”, pertaining to the Falun Gong
religion. In this example, it took more than 5 hours
for the post to appear.
• Camouflaged posts: Weibo also sometimes makes
it appear to a user that their post was successfully
posted, but other users are not able to see the post.
The poster receives no warning message in this
case.
On 1 August 2012 we submitted a post contain-
ing the substring “cgc” (Chen Guangcheng [31]),
and received no warning messages, so it seemed
to be published successfully to our user. When we
tried to access that post from another user account,
however, we were redirected to Weibo’s error page
which claimed the post does not exist.
We found these phenomena to be repeatable. Over the
course of our experiments, we selected a number of dif-
ferent subsets of the keyword list published by the China
Digital Times [4], trying to post them toWeibo manually.
We consistently found all of these same phenomena, al-
though the specific keywords on any list vary over time.
Figure 1 shows that the deletions happen most heav-
ily for a regular post within 5 to 10 minutes of it being
posted. While we believe this process to happen largely
via automation, it is instructive to estimate howmuch un-
aided human labor would otherwise be necessary. Sup-
pose an efficient worker could read 50 posts per minute,
including the reposts and figures included in the posts.
Then to read Weibo’s full 70,000 new posts [34] in one
minute, 1,400 simultaneous workers would be needed.
Assuming 8 hour shifts, 4,200 workers would then be
required. We can imagine that such a staff would have
a high error rate, owing to the repetitive nature of their
work. Such a labor force would also be relatively expen-
sive compared to automation. We instead conclude that
Weibo must be using a large amount of automation, per-
haps keyword-based as has been found in other systems
in China such as TOM-Skype [16]. This is likely com-
plemented with human efforts to evolve and refine the
filtering process.
Some of this refinement certainly results from a cen-
tralized list of topics. Other refinement may occur inter-
nally, through a smaller number of censors who look for
users finding new ways to misspell words or otherwise
work around existing filters. Our subsequent hypotheses
consider how this refinement occurs and delve into how
Weibo’s automation operates.
Hypothesis 2 Weibo targets specific users, such as those
who frequently post sensitive content.
Another way to achieve prompt response to sensitive
posts is to track users who are likely to post sensitive
content, using techniques similar to what we are doing.
The posts from those sensitive users could then be read
by moderators more often and more promptly than the
posts of other users.
To test this hypothesis, we plotted Figure 2. We
grouped users together who have the same number of
censorship events occurring to their posts. The x-axis
is the number of such deletions for each cohort of users.
The y-axis shows how long these to-be-censored posts
live. The clear downward trend is evidence that users
with larger deletion frequencies tend to observe faster
censorship of their work, supporting our hypothesis.
Even though this figure shows us that the more dele-
tion posts a user has, the faster the users’ posts tend to
be deleted, we cannot rule out other features which those
users have in common and that those features may lead to
the fast deletions. For example, they may tend to use the
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Figure 2: Users’ median post lifetime in minutes vs.
the number of deletions for that user on a log-log
scale. Black circles show the median lifetime of posts
in the cohort, and the dotted blue bars show the 25%–
75% range.
same keywords, post from the same geographical area,
use the same kind of client platform, and so on. There is
a clear correlation between post lifetime and post dele-
tion counts, but correlation does not imply causation.
If the surveillance keyword list and targeting of spe-
cific users were the only mechanisms for removing sen-
sitive posts, then the histograms in Figure 1 would stop
at a certain time, say 1 or 2 days. However, 10% of
the deletions happen after one day, with some deletions
occurring one month or more after the post was posted.
Clearly, other mechanisms are in use for these long-tail
censorship events, which leads to our next hypothesis.
Hypothesis 3 When a sensitive post is found, a moder-
ator will use automated searching tools to find all of its
related reposts (parent, child, etc.), and delete them all
at once.
If this hypothesis is true, then the child posts which
repost a censored parent post should all be removed at the
same time. To test this hypothesis, we plot the histogram
of the standard deviation of the deletion time of the posts
sharing the same Repost Identification Number (rpid) in
Figure 3. In our system deleted posts dataset, over 82%
of reposted posts have a deletion time standard deviation
of less than 5 minutes, meaning that a sensitive post is
detected and then most of the other posts in a chain of
reposts are immediately deleted.
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Figure 3: Reposts standard deviation histogram.
There are outliers with standard deviations as high as 5
days which suggest that the mass deletion strategy men-
tioned here is not the only method Weibo employs to
delete sensitive reposts. This leads to our next hypoth-
esis.
Hypothesis 4 Deletion speed is related to the topic.
That is, particular topics are targeted for deletion based
on how sensitive they are.
We performed topical analysis on the deleted posts.
The topical analysis methods we use are described
in Section 5.1. Here, to save space, we only list the top
topic in Table 3. (For further topical discussion, please
refer to our technical report [42].) The third column is the
response time for the censor to discover a sensitive topic.
Specifically, the response time here refers to the period
between the time when the first post on this topic ap-
peared in our user timeline data set and the time when the
Weibo system starts to delete the posts on this topic heav-
ily. These times were identified through manual analysis.
Even when a topic is still being actively censored, it does
not necessarily disappear. People may still discuss the
topic only to have their posts deleted. That is why some
topics appear twice or more in the table. When a topic
showed up again, there is no response time for it and we
indicate this with a dash (‘-’).
The main five topics extracted by Independent Com-
ponent Analysis (ICA, see Section 5) are: Qidong, Qian
Yunhui, Beijing Rainstorm, Diaoyu Island2 and Group
Sex. From Table 3, we can see that these topics have a
2Diaoyu Island is the number 3 top topic on 16 August.
Table 3: Blocked topics.
Date Top 1 Response
Time (hours)
7-20 Support Syrian rebels 21.32
7-21 Lying of gov. (Jixian) 12.20
7-22 Beijing rainstorms 2.55
7-23 Beijing rainstorms (Subway) 1.62
7-24 Beijing rainstormsa 2.65
7-25 Beijing rainstorms (Fangshan) 2.58
7-27 Beijing rainstorms (37 death) 0.82
7-28 Qidong 1.18
7-29 Qidong (Japanese reporter) 2.25
7-30 Complain gov. (Zhou Jun) 5.73
7-31 Judicial independence 2.00
8-01 Complain gov. (Hongkong) 45.30
8-02 Freedom of speech 7.35
8-03 Qidong (Block the village) 31.58
8-04 One-Child Policy Abuse 33.42
8-05 Human Rights News 24.63
8-07 Qian Yunhui Accident 10.87
8-08 Qian Yunhui Accident –
8-09 Group sex 0.78
8-10 RTLb 3.65
8-11 Tang Hui 33.42
8-12 Group sex –
8-13 Corpse Plants in Dalian 532.50
8-14 Hongkong 70.98
8-15 Corpse Plants in Dalian –
8-16 Corpse Plants in Dalian –
8-17 Complain gov. (North Korea) 19.83
8-18 Zhou Kehua (faked) 16.37
aRefuse to donate for Beijing rainstorms.
bRe-education through labor.
relatively short lifetime compared to other topics. These
five topics were also hot topics in our public timeline dur-
ing this period.
This suggests that when sensitive users and a large
number of regular Weibo users are discussing the same
general topic, i.e., the topic is popular in both the user
timeline and public timeline, then extra resources are de-
voted to finding and deleting such posts3. In Section 5
we will show that the sensitive users in the user time-
line combine topics with common themes related to state
power (Beijing, government, China, country, police, and
people). This suggests that the censors consider the com-
bination of these themes with generally popular topics to
warrant extra resources.
3We have not ruled out other possibilities in our study, however,
such as that such topics are viewed by many users and therefore more
likely to be reported by regular users.
5 Topic extraction
Even though we are following a relatively modest num-
ber ofWeibo authors, the volume of text we are capturing
is still too much to process manually. We need automatic
methods to classify the posts that we see, particularly
those which are deleted.
Automatic topic extraction is the process of identify-
ing important terms in the text that are representative of
the corpus as a whole. Topic extraction was originally
proposed by Luhn [19] in 1958. The basic idea is to as-
sign weights to terms and sentences based on their fre-
quency and some other statistical information.
However, when it comes to microblog text, standard
language processing tools become inapplicable [18, 40].
Microblogs typically contain short sentences and casual
language [7]. Unknown words, such as named entities
and neologisms often cause problems with these term-
based models. It can be especially challenging to extract
topics from Asian languages such as Chinese, Korean,
and Japanese, which have no spaces between words.
We applied the Pointillism approach [27] and TF*IDF
to extract hot topics. In the Pointillism model, a corpus
is divided into n-grams; words and phrases are recon-
structed from grams using external information (specifi-
cally, temporal correlations in the appearance of grams),
giving the context necessary to manage informal uses of
the language such as neologisms. Salton’s TF*IDF [10]
assigns weights to the terms of a document based on the
terms’ relative importance to that document compared to
the entire corpus.
We next explain how these techniques work together.
5.1 Algorithm
TF*IDF is a common method to determine the impor-
tance of words to a document in a corpus. The TF*IDF
value in our case is calculated as:
f (t,dday)× logTotal number of posts for the monthf (t,dmonth)
Here, f (t,d)means the frequency of the term t in doc-
ument d. We use trigrams as t, and documents d are sets
of posts over a certain period of time. dday is the deleted
posts we caught on day day. We use the posts of July,
2012 in the public timeline as IDF. f (t,dmonth) is the fre-
quency of term t in the public timeline in July, 2012.
First we calculate TF*IDF scores for all trigrams that
have more than 20 occurrences in a day. The top 1000
trigrams with the highest TF*IDF score will be fed to
our trigram connection algorithm, hereafter “Connector.”
We call these top 1000 trigrams the 1000-TFIDF list.
To connect trigrams back into longer phrases, Connec-
tor finds two trigrams which have two overlapping char-
acters. For instance, if there are ABC and BCD, Con-
nector will connect them to become ABCD. Sometimes
there is more than one choice for connecting trigrams,
e.g., there could also be BCE and BCF. Sometimes tri-
grams can even form a loop. To solve these problems,
we first build directed graphs for the trigrams with a high
TF*IDF score. Each node is a trigram, and edges indi-
cate the overlap information between two trigrams. For
example, if ABC and BCD can be connected to make
ABCD, then there is an edge from ‘ABC’ to ‘BCD’. Af-
ter all trigrams are selected, we use DFT (Depth First
Traversal) to output the nodes. During the DFT we check
to see if a node has been traversed already. If so we
do not traverse it again. After the graphs have been tra-
versed, we obtain a set of phrases.
For example, the Connector output of the third most
popular topic on 4 August 2012 is:
1.头骨进京鸣冤。河北广平县上坡村76岁的农民冯
虎，其子在19
skull go Beijing to redress an injustice. The son of a 76
year old farmer Fenghu, from Shangpo village, Guang-
ping city, Hebei province, was ... at 19
2.头骨进京鸣冤。冯出示的头骨赴京鸣...
skull go Beijing to redress an injustice. The skull shown
by Feng go Beijing to redress an injustice...
3.头骨进京鸣冤。冯出示的头骨前额有一大窟窿，
他...
skull go Beijing to redress an injustice. There is a big hole
on the skull shown by Feng, he...
4.头骨进京鸣冤。冯出示的头骨前额有一个无罪的公
民...
skull go Beijing to redress an injustice. There is a inno-
cent citizen on the skull shown by Feng, he...
5.头骨进京鸣冤。冯出示的头骨进...
skull go Beijing to redress an injustice. The skull shown
by Feng enter...
6.头骨进京鸣冤。冯出示的头等舱
skull go Beijing to redress an injustice. The first class seat
shown by Feng...
7.【華聯社電】上访15年老父携儿头骨...
Chinese Community report: petition 15 years, old father
bring the skull of his son...
In this example, the 7 outputs of Connector are trans-
lated in English, which is written in the next line after the
original Chinese phrase. Outputs 4 and 6 are incorrectly
connected. This is because the same trigrams are shared
by different stories that have high TF*IDF scores on the
same day. This problem can be solved by examining the
cosine similarity of the frequency of occurrence of the
first and the last trigram for each result.
Cosine similarity is used to judge whether two tri-
grams have correlated trends.
cos.Sim=
< Ai,Bi >»�n
i=1Ai
2×
»�n
i=1Bi
2
where<,> denotes an inner product between two vec-
tors. For details, please refer to Song et al. [27].
From the connected sentences, listed above, we can
begin to understand the general events that are driving
major sensitive topics of discussion on Weibo. Table 3
lists the top topics of the deleted posts from 20 July 2012
to 18 August 2012. (A computer failure prevented us
from collecting data on 6 August 2012.) Note that we just
translated the posts from each topical cluster, we have not
confirmed the veracity of any of the claims of the Weibo
users’ posts that we translated.
Interestingly, besides named entities, we also extracted
three neologisms. They are李W阳 (Li Wangyang, from
李旺阳), 六圌四 (June Fourth, from 六四), 胡()涛
(Hu Jintao, from 胡锦涛, replacing the middle charac-
ter with open- and close-parentheses), and启-东,启\东
and启/东 (Qidong, from启东, inserting punctuation be-
tween the two characters). These neologisms became
popular enough that they stood out in our TF*IDF anal-
ysis.
5.2 Hot sensitive topics
Table 3 tells us the top topic for each day in terms of
having the highest TF*IDF scores—however, it does not
tell us which topics among these have been discussed for
the longest period of time by our users. Also, are there
some common themes behind those separate topics?
Here are the top 50 words which have appeared in the
1000-TFIDF list most frequently from 20 July 2012 to
20 August 2013, manually translated to English:
Beijing City, Liu Futang, secretary, Lujiang County,
Guo Jinlong, Qian Yunhui, City Government, Zhou Ke-
hua, Red Cross, Diaoyu Island, subprefect, water drain,
ordinary people, taxpayer, Fangshan district, Hagens, lo-
cal police station, office, Beijing, Qidong, government,
China, Japan, citizen, county’s head commissioner, re-
porter, mayor, corrupt official, freedom, country, re-
strain, keyhole report, wrist watch, police, national, rec-
ommend, American, repression, patriotic, democratic,
corpses, people, donation, cancel, opinion, reeducation
through labor, abolition, truck4
We used Independent Component Analysis (ICA) to
extract “independent signals” from those most important
4For clarity, we have elided close variants on China, Japan, and
Beijing from this list.
terms shown above. ICA [14] is a method to separate a
linearly mixed signal, x, into mutually independent com-
ponents, s.
Let X = [x1,x2, ...,xm]T be the observation mixture
matrix, consisting of m observed signals xi. Since X is
the linear composition of the independent components,
s, X can be modeled as:
X = AS=
m�
i=1
aisi
A, the mixing matrix, gives the coefficients for linear
combinations of the independent signals, the rows of S.
Here, each word is represented by a row vector of
length 864 (36× 24), which contains the 36 days worth
of hourly frequency from 22 July 2012 to 2 Septem-
ber 2012. The 50× 864 matrix X is fed to an ICA
program [25]. The number of independent components
number is set to 5, which retains almost 100% of the
eigenvalues.
There are six words that appear in almost every inde-
pendent signal: Beijing, government, China, country, po-
liceman, and people. This means that the sensitive user
group in our user timeline has these general themes that
cut across the many individual topics that they discuss,
which may explain why their posts are often subject to
censorship.
6 Discussion
Weibo appears to have a variety of other mechanisms that
do not fit neatly into our hypotheses, but which are in-
teresting to discuss. We first consider other aspects of
Weibo’s filtering, then we look at diurnal (time-of-day)
censorship behaviors, and finally we try to synthesize
some of our observations.
6.1 Weibo’s filtering mechanisms
Sina Weibo has a complex variety of censorship mech-
anisms, including both proactive and retroactive mecha-
nisms. Here we summarize the mechanisms Weibo may
apply. Proactive mechanisms, as we discussed in Hy-
pothesis 1, may include: explicit filtering, implicit fil-
tering, and camouflaged posts. Retroactive mechanisms
for removing content that has already been released may
include:
• Backwards reposts search: In our deleted posts
dataset over 82% of reposted posts have a standard
deviation of less than 5 minutes for deletion time,
meaning that a sensitive post is detected and then
most of the other posts in a chain of reposts are then
deleted (Hypothesis 3).
• Backwards keyword search: We also observed
that Weibo sometimes removes posts retroactively
in a way that causes spikes in the deletion rate of a
particular keyword within a short amount of time.
Here, we give two examples (兲朝 and 37人), out
of many that we witnessed, with a strong spike in
the deletion of posts containing that keyword.
We first consider 兲朝, Tian Chao, a neologism
for “Celestial Empire” where 兲 is an alternate
form for 天; the substitute character is visually
similar to the original and also appears to be
constructed from the two distinct characters 王
八，meaning “bastard.”). The frequency of 兲
朝 in deleted posts, day by day, is the sequence
(6,3,0,0,2,2,0,3,0,2,3,3,2,1,2,0,0,1,0,0,0,5,4,4,2,14,3,6,4)
respectively from 28 July 2012 to 25 August 2012.
There is a concentrated deletion (14 censorship
events) of posts with this word within several
minutes on 22 August 2012, impacting posts that
were several weeks old at the time. It is likely that
a censor discovered this new phrase and ordered it
globally expunged.
Another example is the keyword 37人 (37 people).
There are 44 posts containing this keyword, which
were created from 2 days to 5 days before the cen-
sorship event, all removed together within 5 minutes
(03:25 to 03:30 27 July 2012). Those 44 posts are
from different users, have no common parent posts,
and have no common pictures. The only plausible
explanation for this concentrated deletion would ap-
pear to be a keyword-based deletion. The deletion
time at 3:25am Beijing time also strongly suggests
that there are moderators working in the early morn-
ing. To understand this workforce and its distributed
nature, we perform further analysis in Section 6.2.
• Monitoring specific users: Hypothesis 2 shows a
clear preference for Weibo’s censors to pay more at-
tention to users who seemingly like to discuss cen-
sored topics.
• Account closures: Weibo also closes users’ ac-
counts. There were over 300 user accounts closed
by the system from our sensitive user group (out
of over 3,500 users) during the roughly two month
period while when we collected data for their user
timelines.
• Search filtering: To prevent users from finding sen-
sitive information on weibo.com, Weibo also has a
frequently updated list of words [4] which cannot
be searched.
• Public timeline filtering: We believe that sensitive
topics are filtered out of the public timeline. This
filtering appears to be limited to only general topics
that have been known to be sensitive for a relatively
long time. In this paper all major results are based
on the user timeline, we only use the public time-
line for general results about major trending topics
in Weibo.
• User credit points: In May 2012, Sina Weibo an-
nounced a “user credit” points system [22] through
which users can report sensitive or rumor-based
posts to the administrators. We do not know the
extent to which the point system interacts with the
censorship mechanisms that we have already de-
scribed. It is possible that these reports “bubble up”
and help Weibo tune its automated filters, but we
have no way to observe this.
6.2 Time-of-day behavior
In our data, the time at which the censors are working and
deleting posts correlates more with the usage patterns of
regular users than with a typical day-time work schedule
(e.g., 8am to 5pm Beijing time). Figure 4 shows the to-
tal hourly deletions for different kinds of posts (on a log
scale) from 20 July to 8 September 2012. Both “general
deletions” and “system deletions” happen even very late
at night.
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Figure 4: Post deletion amounts over 24 hours.
So do the censors respond as quickly during the night
as during day hours? We plotted the median lifetime of
the posts as a function of their deletion time in Figure 5.
The morning-hour spike suggests that the censors are be-
hind in the morning, both catching up on overnight posts
and dealing with a fresh influx of posts from morning
risers. They catch up by late morning or early afternoon.
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Figure 5: Post lifetime vs. deletion time of the day.
From Figure 4 and Figure 5 it is clear that, while a
significant fraction of the censors seem to work during
regular work hours, many do not.
6.3 Synthesis
Based on everything we have seen and observed, we
can begin to understand how Weibo censorship works.
Clearly, they are using a strong degree of automation to
help them delete posts that have been declared sensitive.
It is also clear that this process is relatively “loose,” in
the sense that there are few sharp rules that define what
gets deleted vs. what is allowed to remain. Given the
long-tailed distribution that we observe in post lifetimes
prior to censorship, it is clear that some posts are not
considered a high priority for censorship, such as if two
friends start conversing with each other using a new ne-
ologism, euphemism, or other coinage that would other-
wise be censorship-worthy. However, when those new
terms spread and grow, they are censored both proac-
tively and retroactively.
This suggests that Weibo is trying to strike a balance
between satisfying the legal requirements within which
it operates and the costs of running a fine-grained in-
strument of political censorship. Weibo must conduct
just enough censorship to satisfy government regulations
without being so intrusive as to discourage users from us-
ing their service. Among other issues, they must surely
be deeply concerned with false positives. If truly innocu-
ous posts disappeared with any regularity, Weibo’s users
might defect to a competing service.
It is unclear the extent to which Weibo is using natu-
ral language processing (NLP) algorithms to aid in their
work, versus having a stable of censors watching for
things to go viral and then using search tools to stamp
them out. Certainly, our use of fairly simple NLP tech-
niques helped reduce the workload of analyzing trend-
ing topics, so comparable techniques may well be in
use by Weibo. NLP techniques in a censor’s hands can
be thought of as a “force multiplier,” but it is unclear
whether they fundamentally change the game. Consider,
with English-language spam emails, the degree to which
spammers will try to evade automated spam classifica-
tion systems. These techniques and more could well
be applied to automated or manual rewriting of post-
ings, with the intent of avoiding automated censorship.
The results might not be as easy to read, but humans
will likely have an advantage at reading jumbled text,
at least until NLP algorithms are extended to deal with
them. Conversely, NLP techniques can cluster together
related terms, assisting censors to overcome such tech-
niques. At least so far, we have not seen evidence of
any sort of arms race between increasingly sophisticated
ways to avoid censorship and increasingly powerful cen-
sorship techniques.
In many ways, Internet censorship is related to intru-
sion detection. When our results in this paper are com-
pared to related work (see Section 1), including both IP-
layer filtering and application-level censorship, a picture
of Internet censorship in China emerges where “defense-
in-depth” is taken to a new level. Intrusion detection
research has long focused on issues such as false pos-
itive vs. false negative tradeoffs, viral spreading pat-
terns, polymorphic content, and the distinction between
different layers of abstraction (such as IP packets vs.
application-layer data). The so-called “Great Firewall of
China” and the accompanying application-layer censor-
ship that China’s domestic web services, such as Weibo,
carry out afford us an opportunity to study a real, national
scale intrusion detection system.
6.4 Major caveats
The most important caveat to keep in mind when inter-
preting our results is that we collected posts from a very
specific core set of users, built up from a “seed” group of
users who post about sensitive topics, which we call the
“user timeline.” Unless otherwise noted, such as when
results are from the public timeline, all results in this
paper are from the user timeline and therefore might be
biased by the differences between this core set of users
and the average Weibo user. All deletion rates, dele-
tion times, etc. must be interpreted in this light. In other
words, our sample users should not be considered to be
representative of the general population of Weibo.
Another important caveat is that our system does not
detect post deletions in the user timeline if the post
deleted is not one of the 50 most recent posts by the user
(see Section 3). This may affect our results about the
distribution of post deletions over time in Section 4.
7 Conclusion
Our research found that deletions happen most heavily in
the first hour after a post has been made (see Figure 1).
Especially for original posts that are not reposts, most
deletions occur within 30 minutes, accounting for 30%
of the total deletions of such posts. Nearly 90% of the
deletions of such posts happen within the first 24 hours
of the post.
With respect to the hypotheses enumerated in Sec-
tion 4, we make the following conclusions:
• Hypothesis 1: The Weibo system keeps more than
one keyword list, where each list triggers a different
kind of censorship behavior.
• Hypothesis 2: The clear downward trend in Figure 2
could be evidence that certain users are flagged for
closer scrutiny, but we have not ruled out other
causes in this paper.
• Hypothesis 3: Figure 3 shows that over 82% of re-
posted posts have a standard deviation of less than
5 minutes deletion time, meaning that a sensitive
post is detected and then most of the other posts in
a chain of reposts are then deleted.
• Hypothesis 4: As described in Section 4, us-
ing the methods described in Section 5 we find
that topics that were trends in the user timeline
and were also, according to the public timeline,
hot topics in public discussion as a whole about
events that happened during our month of data
collection (Qidong, Qian Yunhui, Beijing Rain-
storms, Diaoyu islands, and a group sex scandal)
had very short lifetimes. Recall that the deleted
posts in the user timeline included themes related
to state power (Beijing, government, China,
country, policeman, and people). This sug-
gests that such broadly discussed topics are tar-
geted with more censorship resources to limit cer-
tain kinds of discussion about the events.
Future work may reveal many mechanisms beyond
those we described here, and many different strategies
that Weibo uses to prioritize what content to delete. Our
results suggest that Weibo employs a distributed, hetero-
geneous strategy for censorship that has a great amount
of “defense-in-depth.”
One aspect of censorship that is not considered in our
analysis, but would be an interesting topic for future
work, is the interactions between social media and tra-
ditional media. Leskovec et al. [17] gives an interesting
analysis of the interplay between blogs and traditional
media during the 2008 U.S. Presidential election. Tradi-
tional media relevant to Weibo may include the state-run
media that is heavily censored, or off-shore news out-
lets that are uncensored but limited in availability and
sometimes offset from China’s news cycles by timezone
differences.
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